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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The respondent asserts that the pertinent questions 
presented for review among the six listed by the appellant can be 
subsumed in the following three: 
1. Does a mistake on an unsigned reminder notice effect 
a decrease in the rental rate for storage units? 
2. Were the remedies taken by and afforded to the 
plaintiff for defendants failure to pay the full amount of rent 
in accordance with law? 
3. Did the Court of Appeals have jurisdiction to review 
the postjudgment actions of the trial court, and if so, were such 
actions in accordance with law? 
JURISDICTION 
Based on the fact that the Order of Affirmance in the 
Utah Court of Appeals was dated June 5, 1990, and that the Order 
Denying Petition for Rehearing was dated July 2, 1990, copies of 
both of which documents are in defendant's Petition, plaintiff 
does not contest that this Court has jurisdiction to consider a 
Writ of Certiori under Sections 78-2a-4 and Subsections 78-2-2(3)(a) 
and (5) of the Utah Code. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The trial court granted Summary Judgment and denied a 
Motion for a New Trial. The plaintiff made a Motion to Dismiss the 
appeal under Rule 3(a) and in the alternative, a Motion for Summary 
Affirmance pursuant to Rule 10(a)(2) on August 11, 1989, but to no 
avail. However, the case was calendared and affirmed under Rule 
2 
31/ since it involved uncomplicated factual issues based primarily 
on documents and was a review of summary judgment based on 
uncomplicated issues of law where the substantive rules of law 
were settled. 
Summary Judgment Basis 
In its Motion for Summary Judgment/ which is included in 
the record on appeal (ROA) at 56/ plaintiff listed the following 
material undisputed facts. As to the pleadings cited in this list/ 
the Answer and its Exhibits are found at ROA 70, the Admissions 
at ROA 63 (and 56)/ the Affidavit of Audrey Hooper at ROA 56, the 
Affidavit of Steven J. Nelson at ROA 56/ the Affidavit of Lynn 
P. Heward at ROA 56/ the Three-Day Notice and Return at ROA 74, the 
Rental Agreement at ROA 74 and 56 and included in the Petition/ 
the reminder notice at ROA 74 and 56 and attached hereto, and the 
Complaint and its attachments at ROA 74. 
1. Plaintiff is doing business in Utah County, State 
of Utah, and the owner of the premises situated at 420 East 620 
South in the City of American Fork, County of Utah, State of Utah, 
which includes self-storage units, specifically including units 
143 and 144. (Answer *[ 1) 
2. The amount in controversy is less than $10,000 
exclusive of costs. (Answer 5T 1) 
3. The defendant William L. Echols resides in Utah 
County, State of Utah. (Answer <T 1) 
4. On or about June 12, 1987, the plaintiff (hereinafter 
sometimes referred to as American) and the defendant (hereinafter 
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sometimes referred to as Echols) entered into a Rental Agreement 
pursuant to which American did let and rent to Echols the said 
storage units 143 and 144. (Answer 5 1) 
5. As shown in the said Rental Agreement, a copy of 
which is included in the Petition and by this reference incor-
porated herein, the rental agreement was for a month-to-month term 
based on a calendar month, with either party having the right to 
terminate the Agreement by giving written notice of such termination 
to the other party at least 15 days prior to the end of the month. 
(Answer If 1) 
6. The said Agreement provided for rent at the rate of 
$55 per month for both units, with American having the right to 
increase the rent by giving notice of the increase at least 15 
days prior to the month when the increase was to be effective. 
(Answer 5 1) 
7. Effective February 1, 1988, the rent of the said two 
units was increased to a total of $80 per month. (Answer if 1) 
8. American gave notice of this said increase in rent 
in accordance with the Rental Agreement, and/or any defect in the 
manner or timing of the notice was waived by Echols and the notice 
and the increased rent was accepted and agreed upon. (Answer l[ 1) 
9. Echols paid $80 on each of three occasions, February 
1, March 8, and April 8, all in 1988. (Answer y 2) 
10. The said Rental Agreement provided for Echols to 
pay a $7 late fee for all payments not received within 10 days 
of the first of the month. (Answer f 1) 
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11. Thus on April 8, 1988, Echols had paid the rent for 
the period through April of 1988. (Admission 51 1 for #2) 
12. In the month of May, 198 8, Echols made a payment 
in the sum of $55. He has excused himself for paying this lesser 
amount by arguing that a reminder notice for that month specified 
the old rent. A copy of the said reminder notice is attached 
hereto. (Answer IF 3) 
13. Echols made four more monthly payments of $55 each 
to American despite communication to him clearly indicating that 
the notice for May was a mistake and that the rental rate of $8 0 
per month had not changed. (Answer $ 4, Affidavit of Audrey 
Hooper) 
14. In view of Echols1 failure to pay $25 of the $80 
demanded for each of these months, American denied Echols access 
to his units beginning in May of 1988 and extending until September 
10, 1988. (Answer 1[ 5) 
15. On or about September 10, 1988, American gave written 
notice to Echols that the rent would increase to $94 per month for 
the two units effective October 1, 1988. (Answer 5 4 and Exhibit 
6, and Admission 1[ 1 for #7) 
16. Also on or about September 10, 1988, American agreed 
that it would waive all prior defaults provided that Echols either 
began paying the current properly increased rent of $47 per unit, 
or moved his belongings out. (Affidavit of Steven J. Nelson) 
17. On September 10, 1988, defendant was allowed access 
to his units for the purpose of moving his belongings out in the 
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event he chose that alternative . (Answer JT 4) 
18. Echols did not move all of his belongings out of the 
units, and still has not removed them. (Admission f 1 on #9) 
19. Echols claimed that American owed him in excess of 
$5,000 for formerly denying him access to his belongings. As 
indicated in his letter dated October 10, 1988, a copy of which was 
attached to the Complaint herein and by this reference incorporated 
herein, he planned to add interest at the rate of 1.5% per month 
and deduct the $94 monthly rental from this $5,000 plus interest. 
(Admission 51 1 on #10) 
20. American never agreed that it owed Echols this 
money, nor that Echols could offset such claims against rent. 
(Admission J 6 on #11) 
21. After making the said five payments of $55 each 
during May through September of 1988, Echols made no further cash 
payments to plaintiff. (Admissions f 1 on 14) 
22. No representative or agent of American ever physical 
entered any of the subject units rented by Echols without his 
permission. (Affidavit of Steven J. Nelson) 
23. However American did follow the extrajudicial 
remedies provided for contractually and by law when there is a 
default, and denied Echols access to the storage units he was 
renting during the period of November 10, 1988 through January 3, 
1989. (Answer f 10, Affidavit of Steven J. Nelson) 
24. A Three-Day Notice to Pay Rent or Vacate dated 
December 23, 1988, executed by Lynn P. Heward on behalf of the 
6 
American, and requiring the payment of $448 was properly served on 
Echols on January 4r 1989. Thus American had determined to avail 
itself of the judicial remedies and eviction procedures provided 
by statute. (Three-Day Notice to Pay Rent or Vacate and the 
return attesting to its service attached to the Complaint) 
25. The said Notice also included a Notice to Quit 
providing that in any event Echols would be required to quit the 
premises by the end of January, 1989. (Admission f 1 on #16) 
26. This notice of termination was given in a proper 
and timely manner to make the termination effective no later than 
as of the end of January, 1989. (Three-Day Notice to Pay Rent or 
Vacate and the return attesting to its service) 
27. Once again, Echols was given access to his units. 
Confirmation that such access was available was left for him before 
the said Notice was served. (Answer IT 1) 
28. Nevertheless, Echols failed to either pay the said 
$448 rent in cash or vacate the premises. (Admission 5 1 on #4 
and #9) 
29. The monthly rental and the rental value of the 
premises is $94 per month, or approximately $3 per day. (Affidavit 
of Steven J. Nelson) 
30. The said Rental Agreement provided that in the 
event of default on the part of Echols, he would pay all costs and 
expenses, including a reasonable attorney's fee, which might arise 
or accrue from enforcing the agreement, or in obtaining possession 
of the premises, or otherwise resulting from enforcement of any 
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right arising out of such default. (Answer f 1, Rental Agreement 
included in the Petition) 
31. Should this case be disposed of upon Motion for 
Summary Judgment, reasonable attorney's fees will amount to $lf500 
and costs will amount to $65. (Affidavit of Lynn P. Heward) 
The foregoing list of undisputed material facts presented 
to the trial court at the time of the Motion for Summary Judgment 
and to the Court of Appeals would still seem to include all of the 
facts necessary to determine whether the trial court and Court of 
Appeals were correct in ruling as they did in the appealed orders. 
Post-Judgment Events 
Since the defendant has referred to numerous events 
subsequent to the granting of the Motion for Summary Judgment, 
some of which are not referred to or included in the record on 
appeal, a list of those events will be added hereto. 
1. A Minute Entry dated June 15, 1989 conveyed Judge 
Backlund's decision to grant plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment 
and deny defendant's Motion for Dismissal. ROA at 48. In accordance 
therewith, an Order and Judament was prepared and a copy mailed to 
the defendant on June 16, 1989. ROA at 43. This Order and Judgment 
was subsequently signed and entered June 28, 1989, and is being 
appealed. ROA at 15. 
2. On that same day, June 28, 1989, the clerk of the court 
executed a Writ of Restitution and an Execution. ROA at 10, 11 
26. These were given to a Utah County Constable, along with a 
Praecipe from the plaintiff's attorney directing that all nonexempt 
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property still in the storage units be sold pursuant to the Executi 
ROA at 42. 
3. The Constable thereupon restored the premises to the 
plaintiff on June 29, 1989 and published a Notice of Property Sale 
dated June 29, 1989 scheduling a sale of the listed property found 
in the storage units for July 11, 1989 at 12:00 noon. ROA at 10, 
11, 26. 
4. Meanwhile, the Defendant's Motion to Stay Proceeding 
to Enforce a Judgment and the Defendant's Motion for New Trial were 
filed June 19, 1989, the Defendant's Motion to Vacate Summary 
Judgment was filed July 7, 1989, and the Defendant's Motion for 
Temporary Restraining Order was filed July 10, 1989. ROA at 44, 
45, 38, 35. 
5. On July 11, 1989 at about 11:30 a.m., Judge Joseph 
I. Dimick was presented ex-parte with an Order to Grant Temporary 
Restraining Order Against the Plaintiff, which he executed at that 
time. ROA at 33. 
6. kfter the expiration of the Restraining Order on July 
14, 1989, the Notice of Property Sale was again given, this time 
for July 25, 1989 at noon. ROA at 10, 11. 
7. Defendant then apparently renewed the earlier Defendant 
Motion to Stay Proceeding to Enforce a Judgment by filing on July 
17, 1989 Defendant's Motion to Stay Proceedings by Plaintiff to 
Enforce Summary Judgment Against Defendant. ROA at 24. 
8. On July 20, 1989, the trial court issued a Ruling 
listing and denying all of the defendant's post-judgment motions. 
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ROA at 18. On that same date defendant filed the Notice of Appeal 
appealing from the original Summary Judgment as well as from that 
denial of his Motion for New Trial and to Vacate Summary Judgment. 
ROA at 15. 
9. On July 21, 1989 defendant filed a case in this 
Court of Appeals, Echols v. Fourth Circuit Court, No. 890455, 
seeking an extraordinary writ and referring to the said July 20, 
1989 Ruling and to the Notice of Property Sale regarding the sale 
set for July 25, 1989 at noon. No writ was issued. 
10. Defendant's Motion for Disposition of Property was 
then filed on July 26, 1989, requesting the names of the buyers of 
the property, a list of what was sold, and the amount paid. ROA 
at 13. This was partially granted by means of a Ruling on Defendant's 
Motion for Disposition of Property dated August 10, 1989, with 
plaintiff being required to furnish a written accounting of the 
property sold and the amount received and applied to expenses of 
sale and the judgment amount, but not being required to give the 
name and address of the buyer of such items. ROA at 2. The Accounting 
of Property Sold dated August 17, 1989 was filed in compliance 
with that Ruling. ROA at 79. 
11. On August 15, 1989, the trial court issued an Order 
in Supplemental Proceedings requiring the defendant to appear 
before the court and answer questions concerning his property, but 
declined to allow that Order to be served by mail. ROA at 1. 
Since he had not been served prior to a hearing on September 26, 
1989, the court ordered him to answer questions at that time 
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concerning his property. He answered many questions, but refused 
to divulge the location of a camera and of the video games that 
had been stored in the units before, the denial of access to which 
had allegedly caused him damages of $5,000. ROA at 95, 69. 
12. When the court informed him that he must state 
where those games were, and he still refused, the court found him 
to be in contempt of court, and he was incarcerated until he would 
answer the questions presented. ROA at 93, 96. 
13. Two days later he was willing to talk to plaintiff's 
counsel. At that time he stated he did not own these items any 
more and did not know where they were. However he refused to 
state their last known whereabouts. 
14. On October 4, 1989, counsel for the parties appeared 
at a hearing and stipulated to an arrangement, later embodied in an 
Order dated October 25, 1989, which allowed for the immediate 
release of the defendant from jail and specified a course of 
action by means of which he could remain free. ROA at 102. That 
course of action was essentially followed. 
15. Also on October 4, 1989, counsel for defendant 
mentioned for the first time in this action that some of the 
property sold may have been exempt. The first written reference 
by the defendant to any exempt property was the Defendant's Motion 
for Enforcement of Exempt Property Allowances dated November 17, 
1989, again filed pro se. Defendant's counsel had appeared on 
October 4, 1989 and withdrew on November 21, 1989. ROA at 98. 
16. The said Motion for Enforcement of Exempt Property 
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Allowances was essentially denied by the Ruling dated December 6, 
1989, referring to the Ruling dated August 10, 1989. ROA at 1. 
REASONS TO DENY CERTIORI 
Petitioner appears to rely on Rule 46(c) in petitioning 
this Court for a Writ of Certiori, arguing that the Court of 
Appeals "has departed so far from the accepted and usual course of 
of judicial proceedings as to call for an exercise of this Court's 
supervision." Petition at 2. 
However, the Court of Appeals was entirely correct and 
acted properly in affirming the trial court's Summary Judgment, as 
can be seen from a brief review of the law pertaining to the issues 
recited above. 
1. A MISTAKE ON AN UNSIGNED REMINDER NOTICE DOES NOT EFFECT 
A DECREASE IN THE RENTAL RATE FOR STORAGE UNITS. 
This whole case began when Echols claimed that he only 
had to pay $55 a month instead of $80 per month for his two storage 
units. This claim was based on the reminder notice attached hereto. 
As a matter contract interpretation, and thus as a 
matter of law, this reminder notice did not reduce the rent. 
As it was written, the Rental Agreement in paragraph II 
provided for a method to increase the rent. However, there was no 
way set forth to decrease the rent. Thus the only way the rent 
could be reduced would be to have an amendment. 
Paragraph IX.g. of the Rental Agreement specifically 
states, "No amendment or alteration shall be binding unless made 
in writing and signed by both parties." 
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There never was any amendment or alteration in writing 
and signed by both parties. Hence there was no reduction in rent. 
There is no allegation that plaintiff intended to reduce 
the rent, and plaintiff did nothing that would estop the plaintiff 
from denying a decrease in the rent. 
In the first place, it was a mistake on a reminder 
notice. It would not be reasonable for someone to rely on that 
notice, without more, to evidence an intent to reduce the rent 
from the level to which it had recently been raised back down to 
the previous level. 
In the second place, as soon as plaintiff had any indicati 
that the mistake had been made and relied upon, every effort was 
made to clarify that it was only a mistake and there had never 
been any intention to reduce the rent. 
A case which includes many of the principles which 
should thus be applied in analyzing this matter is Provo City 
Corp. v. Nielson Scott Co., 603 P.2d 803 (Utah 1979). 
First, this case shows that the trial court was quite 
able to interpret the contract without having to make a factual 
determination. 
Second, although there could have been a modification of 
the agreement allowing a reduction in the amount of rent, despite 
the lack of provision in the original agreement for such a reduction 
this could only have happened if there was a meeting of the minds. 
Likewise in the instant matter, there is no allegation 
or proof of a meeting of the minds. Rather, there is overwhelming 
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and undisputed proof of inadvertence and an absence of intention 
and a lack of meeting of the minds on the part of the plaintiff as 
to any reduction in rent. 
Finally, there are no ambiguities in the subject contract 
relating to a reduction in rent. There are simply no provision 
for such a reduction. It follows that no such provision should be 
added. 
Thus, as a matter of law in contract interpretation, 
there was no effective decrease in rent, and hence no need to 
follow the procedures for increasing the rent in order to maintain 
it at the previous level. 
Defendant argues that the courts wrongfully ignored a 
discrepancy between the deposed testimony and the signed affidavit 
of the former manager. Affidavit of Audrey Hooper at ROA 56 and 
included in Petition. The only discrepancy is that the affidavit 
acknowledges a mistake by the manager (herself) in filling out the 
reminder notice and the deposition clarifies that the mistake was 
actually made by an underling helping her. ROA at 53 (Compare 
Deposition p. 34 ROA at 50). Thus the discrepancy is completely 
immaterial. 
2. THE REMEDIES TAKEN BY AND AFFORDED TO THE PLAINTIFF 
FOR DEFENDANT'S FAILURE TO PAY THE FULL AMOUNT OF RENT WERE IN 
ACCORDANCE WITH LAW. I 
Plaintiff had a legal contractual and statutory right 
to deny defendant access to the storage units beginning in May of 
1988 and extending until September 10, 1988. 
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Paragraph VIII. b. of the Rental Agreement set forth the 
remedy of denying the defendant access to his personal property, 
and specified that this remedy was available to the plaintiff 
alone or in conjunction with other remedies in the event of default 
Chapter 38-8 of the Utah Code impliedly or implicitly 
provides for and condones such denial of access where it is permitt 
under the terms of the rental agreement pertaining to a self-storag 
facility. Specifically, Section 38-8-3 sets forth the procedure 
for selling the personal property stored in self-storage units, 
and provides that no such enforcement of the lien can be taken 
until after notice has been given, which notice must advise of the 
"denial of access to the personal property, if such denial is 
permitted under the terms of the rental agreement" (Subsection 
38-8-3(3)(c)). 
Thus the only prerequisite for the denial of access is 
that such denial be permitted under the terms of the rental agreemei 
Such permission is found in the Agreement as follows: 
VIII. DEFAULT BY OCCUPANT: Time is of the 
essence in the performance of obligations 
created by this Rental Agreement. Failure of 
the Occupant to perform in a timely manner any 
obligation or duty set forth in this Rental 
Agreement shall constitute Default and Owner 
may proceed to do any or all of the following: 
a. Terminate Occupant's right of possession 
of the Storage Unit by any lawful means. 
b. Deny Occupant access to the personal 
property. 
c. Provide written notice of the default and 
the Owners claim to the Occupant [and others] of 
the Owner's claim, a brief and general description 
of the personal property subject to the Owner's 
lien, notification of denial of access to the 
personal property, a demand for payment, and a 
statement that, unless the claim is paid 
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within the time stated, the personal property 
will be sold or otherwise disposed of, as 
provided by law. 
d. Take appropriate action to enforce the 
Owner's lien rights as is provided by law. 
... [Emphasis added.] 
Plaintiff thus under the contract had the right and 
option to follow any or all of the lettered courses of action to 
obtain a remedy for defendant's failure to pay the full amount of 
rent under the Agreement. 
The plaintiff first chose option b. This led to numerous 
letters and documents and arguments and threats from the defendant• 
So plaintiff offered to forget the default if defendant would 
forget his claims and thereafter abide by the contract. However, 
defendant again defaulted and eventually would pay nothing except 
allow an offset on his alleged claim. Again plaintiff initially chose 
option b. as a remedy. 
Finally, plaintiff decided to follow option a. instead 
of c. and d. Thus defendant was allowed access to his units and 
plaintiff followed the procedures estabished for an unlawful 
detainer action. 
Therefore, in light of the Rental Agreement and the 
applicable statutes, plaintiff did nothing that was actionable or 
prohibited by law. 
3. THE COURT OF APPEALS DID NOT HAVE JURISDICTION TO REVIEW 
THE POSTJUDGMENT ACTIONS OF THE TRIAL COURT, WHICH ACTIONS WERE IN 
ACCORDANCE WITH LAW. 
As mentioned in the Statement of the Case above, there 
was a Notice of Appeal dated and filed July 20, 1989 appealing (1) 
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the Order and Judgment dated June 28, 1989 which granted plaintiff1 
Motion for Summary Judgment, including dismissal with prejudice of 
the Counterclaim, and denied defendant's Motion for Dismissal; and 
(2) the Ruling dated July 20, 1989 insofar as it denied the defenda 
Motion for New Trial and Motion to Vacate Summary Judgment. 
However, no other notice of appeal was filed. Therefore 
the Court of Appeals did not and could nnot have jurisdiction to 
review any order of the trial court entered after July 20, 1989 
and before December 15, 1989. These orders include but are not 
limited to all matters pertaining to enforcement of the said Order 
and Judgment, and specifically (1) the Ruling on Defendant's 
Motion for Disposition of Property dated August 10, 1989 denying 
the defendant's motion to require the defendant to furnish the 
name and address of the buyer of each item sold at the execution 
sale (ROA at 2); and (2) the Ruling dated December 6, 1989 essential 
denying Defendant's Motion for Enforcement of Exempt Property 
Allowances dated and filed November 17, 1989. 
On November 1, 1989, the Court of Appeals issued an 
Order Denying Motion for Relief, in which the said Motion for 
Relief was denied, a copy of which Order is attached hereto. The 
Order reviewed a number of possible interpretations of the Motion 
for Relief, and gave corresponding reasons for denial. It went on 
to state that "proceedings occurring subsequent to the final order 
being appealed are outside the scope of the issues on appeal, a 
defect which cannot be cured by amendment of the docketing statement 
filed in this appeal." 
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Rather than by amending the docketing statement, review 
of a postjudgment order is obtained by filing a notice of appeal. 
As indicated in the case of Cahoon v. Cahoon, 641 P.2d 
140 (Utah 1982), postjudgment orders are independently subject to 
the test of finality, according to their substance and effect. If 
a party desires to appeal such a final order, that party must 
follow the procedure established and file a notice of appeal 
within the 30 days. 
When such a notice of appeal is not filed, or is not 
filed in a timely manner, summary dismissal for lack of jurisdiction 
is appropriate. State v. Palmer, 777 P.2d 521 (Utah App. 1989). 
Since the orders dealing with the enforcement of the 
Order and Judgment were all entered more than 3 0 days ago, and 
have not been referred to in any notice of appeal, they cannot be 
reviewed. 
However, no error nor need for redress arose during 
those postjudgment proceedings. The Order and Judgment was entered 
after its form had been reviewed by the defendant for the appropriate 
amount of time. The Execution and Writ of Restitution could be 
and were issued immediately. 
Defendant has complained that property not belonging to 
him and/or property that was exempt was sold by the Constable. 
As to property not belonging to him, that would not seem 
to be a defense. The contract provision VIII.d. clearly provides 
in capital letters that in the event of a default "ALL ARTICLES 
STORED ... WILL BE SOLD OR OTHERWISE DISPOSED OF TO PAY CHARGES." 
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This contract provisionr as well as the law allowing for a lien 
and foreclosure of that lien by sale of the personal property, 
cannot be circumvented merely by having someone other than the 
owner contract for the storage. 
As to the claim that the property was exempt, although 
there may not be any statute that requires the person entitled to 
an exemption to make it known, it appears that requirement is 
implied. For example, in Section 78-23-12 of the Utah Code, it stai 
If an individual fails to select property 
entitled to be claimed as exempt or to object 
to a levy on the property or to assert any 
other right under this chapter, the spouse or 
a dependent of the individual or any other 
authorized person may make the claim or objection 
or assert the rights provided by this chapter. 
This statute would not be necessary, or certainly not 
necessary in such general terms, if Echols had no duty to come 
forward before or at the time of the sale and assert any exemption 
rights he might claim. 
At this time, the defendant has made known his claim. 
However, it was and is too late to claim an exemption. 
In Oliver v. Mitchell, 14 Utah 2d 9, 376 P.2d 390 (1962), 
it was pointed out the claim to an exemption would have to be made 
before the sale: 
We have no statute providing a formal time 
and manner for claiming an insurance exemption. 
However, there is no reason why the general 
rule should not apply to allow proof of exemption 
any time before sale. Ixl. 14 Utah 2d at 13. 
In the instant matter, not only was the sale held before 
any mention of a claim of exemption (or ownership by other parties), 
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but the physical possession was transferred to the purchaser who 
was an independent third party, the money paid to the plaintiff, 
and much of the property resold by that purchaser. 
Defendant filed numerous documents pertaining to the 
sale, both before and after it was held. But none of these oppor-
tunities were used to mention any claim of exemption. 
Finally, on November 17, 1989, nearly four months after 
the sale, the first documents were filed by defendant which referred 
to exempt property. These documents were filed too late to be 
part of the record on appeal. Likewise, they were filed too late 
for the Court to be able to equitably make allowance for any such 
exemption. All the items of personal property had been sold in a 
final sale on July 25, 1989, to an unrelated third party, and 
nearly all of the items have been resold to other parties since then. 
Not only does the delay in claiming an exemption bar 
defendant from now claiming error, but it indicates that in all 
likelihood, nothing was sold that was exempt. Another such indication 
is that he and/or his family reside in a home which is probably 
furnished with their belongings. Defendant would never divulge 
his home address. He has indicated he has a wife and children 
living in a home in Utah County, but he will not be more specific 
as to the address. It is only logical that the property that 
would be exempt from execution would thus be in a residence at a 
location unknown to plaintiff. 
CONCLUSION 
The appealed orders of the trial court were properly affirmed 
20 
in all respects, since in view of the undisputed facts, they 
comported with law, justice, and equity. Therefore the Appellant's 
Petition for Writ of Certiori should be denied. 
DATED this 2- ~7 ^  day of , ^ £ , 1990 
LYNN P. HEWARD 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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per agreement with the defendant) of the foregoing Brief in Oppositi 
were mailed to William L. Echols, 733 North 800 West, Provo, Utah 
84601 on this t 7^ day of ^-£ , 1990, with postage attac 
thereon. 
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» f t«r t l i t 10th of th« 
Month 














OETACH AT PERFORATION. THIS IS YOUR RECEIPT 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
OOOoo 
WOVr^l 1989 
j [Jus st-*.' 
«;i M Court 
American Fork Investors/ a 
California limited partnership/ 
dba American Self Storage/ 
Plaintiff and Respondent/ 
v. 
William L. EcholS/ 
Defendant and Appellant. 
ORDER DENYING MOTION 
FOR RELIEF 
Case No. 890461-CA 
Appellant is proceeding pro se and has filed a "motion for 
relief/" the exact purpose of which is less than clear. 
Insofar as the motion is one for a stay, it must be denied 
because appellant has failed to comply with the requirements of 
Jensen v. Schwendiman, 744 P.2d 1026 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
Insofar as he otherwise seeks to suspend enforcement of the 
judgment/ the motion must be denied because he has not filed a 
supersedeas bond as required by Utah R. Civ. P. 62(d). Insofar 
as the motion seeks summary reversal of the judgment appealed 
from# summary reversal has previously been denied. The present 
demand for reversal is inadequately supported and'must also be 
denied. 
Furthermore/ proceedings occurring subsequent to the final 
order being appealed are outside the scope of the issues on 
appeal/ a defect which cannot be cured by amendment of the 
docketing statement filed in this appeal. 
Appellant's motions are accordingly denied. 
/it-Dated this _J day of November, 1989. 
FOR THE COURT: 
Gregoxy me, Judge 
